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Abstract
Direct incentives and punishments are the most common instruments to
ﬁght tax evasion. The theoretical literature disregarded indirect schemes,
such as itemised deductions, in which an agent has an interest in that other
agents declare their revenue. Itemised deductions provide an incentive for
consumers to declare their purchases, and this forces sellers to do the same. I
show that, for any level of taxation, it is possible to increase tax proceeds by
choosing the proper level of itemised deduction; the cost for the government
on the consumers’ side is more than compensated by the extra proceeds on
the sellers’ side.
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1 Introduction
For most countries tax evasion is a major issue and tax proceeds are strongly af-
fected. By its nature, it is hard to estimate tax evasion. Franzoni (1999) estimates
that the US federal tax gap1 is about 17%. Slemrod (2007) proposes an upda-
ted and detailed description of tax compliance in the United States. In the 80’s,
the black economy in western countries represented 5% to 15% of GDP (Cowell
(1985)). More recently, McKay (1998) and Schneider (2005) estimated that the
black economy roughly ranges from 6% (Switzerland) to 27% (Italy) of GDP.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and (1991) are amongst the most well known
works on tax compliance. Many surveys are available of the recent literature on
tax avoidance and/or evasion:2 among the most complete, Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002) focus on tax avoidance and it is more theory oriented while Andreoni, Erard,
and Feinstein (1998) concentrate more on empirical works.
Social welfare reasons exist for not ﬁghting tax evasion: it is generally expensive
to reduce evasion; furthermore, taxes are distortive and evasion may partially
overcome this distortion.3 Finally, if evasion is negatively correlated with income,
tax evasion will have redistributive eﬀects. Section 7 of Cowell (1985) oﬀers other
arguments for and against ﬁghting tax evasion. For an analysis of the welfare
consequences of tax evasion, see Davidson, Martin, and Wilson (2007).
A politician may want to reduce evasion nevertheless, so as to increase tax
proceeds; to promote the country’s image on an international ground; or simply
because tax evasion is illegal. Note also that black money is more likely to ﬁnance
other illegal activities (Fortin, Lacroix, and Montmarquette (2000)): by reducing
evasion, the government reduces funds spent on illicit activities. Finally, in the
presence of equality/fairness concerns, some agents may have a disutility from
knowing that other people evade.
The literature on tax evasion is mainly devoted to income taxation.4 Most of
the analysis of tax evasion concentrates on how evasion can be deterred through
1Tax gap, according to the United States Department of Treasury, measures the extent to
which taxpayers do not ﬁle their tax returns and pay the correct tax on time.
2Tax evasion consists of not declaring some earnings that, by law, an agent is supposed to
declare, while tax avoidance consists of abusing some laws or, often, using the lack of detail in
some laws, to reduce the tax burden.
3In the presence of information asymmetries and diﬀerent revenue elasticities, the (second-
best) choice of government may distort sectors diﬀerently, and evasion may have a counterba-
lancing eﬀect.
4Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and Marelli (1984) are notable exceptions.
1detection and sanctions (Franzoni (1999)); rational consumers decide whether to
evade or not on a “cost-beneﬁt” analysis.5 The legislator disposes of a wide set of
instruments to ﬁght tax evasion (e.g., auditing, ﬁnes, incentives not to evade, direct
taxes to make it harder to evade); the cost of auditing and agents’ limited liability
strongly limit the legislator’s policy space. People receive direct incentives not to
evade (such as decreasing tax rates), and evading becomes more costly (through
higher ﬁnes or by using more sophisticated audit systems).
I instead focus on the indirect mechanism of itemised deductions. Deductions
are not a widely used policy instrument: in Italy and Spain allowed deductions
represent at most 5% of taxable income, in the UK and Ireland up to 9%; in all
OECD countries itemised deductions are below 15%, excepted for France and the
Scandinavian countries, where deductions range between 25% and 30% (OECD
(1990)).
I show that giving incentives to consumers to declare their purchases reduces
tax evasion by forcing sellers to declare their revenue. I consider a market with
a consumption good available both legally and on the black market. Proﬁts on
the legal market and consumers’ income are both taxed. Tax rates (on proﬁts and
on income) are exogenous (possibly optimally chosen). Itemised deductions allow
consumers to reduce their tax base by declaring their purchases; this force sellers
to declare their earnings too.6
The itemised deduction that maximises tax proceeds is always strictly positive,
which means that, ceteris paribus, introducing deductions implies: a) that the
public budget constraint is relaxed (higher tax proceeds and/or lower tax rates)
and b) that the size of the underground market shrinks. My model shows that
partial deductibility of expenditures is suﬃcient enough of an incentive for the
consumers to declare their purchases without negatively aﬀecting tax proceeds.
The reduction in the amount of collected taxes from consumers is less substantial
than the increase in tax proceeds deriving from the reduction in the evasion of the
tax on proﬁts.
Section 2 presents the framework of the model. In section 3 I solve the model
and ﬁnd the optimal level of deduction. Section 4 analyses the results and provides
a numerical example. The last section concludes.
5Note that evasion may also derive from the willingness to hide illegal activities: even with a
0% tax rate, the underground economy would still represent about 4% of GDP, because of illegal
activities and agents willing to avoid regulation laws (McKay (1998)).
6A similar idea has been used in France over the last decades: the government partially
subsidises the rent of the poorest citizens through the “Aide au Logement”. Landlords are
forced to declare their renting income or to reduce the rent by the value of the subsidy.
22 The model
I describe here the main elements of the model: I start (subsection 2.1) by descri-
bing the goods in the economy and the agents’ behaviour; then I analyse the orga-
nisation of the market and the ﬁrms’ behaviour (subsection 2.2); ﬁnally I present
the problem of the central authority (politician/social planner) (subsection 2.3).
2.1 The agents
A representative consumer can choose between the numeraire good M and a
consumption good available both legally (X) and illegally (Y): x denotes the quan-
tity of good exchanged on the legal market at price p, and y is the quantity pur-
chased on the black market at price q.
For a consumer, X and Y are versions of a same good. It is natural to assume
(in terms of the utility function) that the two goods are substitute. The degree
of substitutability may range from perfect subsitutability (e.g., a shop that may
register or not the transaction) to very low substitutability (e.g., an illegal copy
of a technological product, possibly with very diﬀerent technical characteristics).
Regardless of the possible diﬀerences between the two versions of the good, a
consumer may have a preference for legal purchases over the illegal ones; for that
reason, I introduce a parameter in the utility function allowing to consider for the
aversion towards illegality (the parameter accounts for the depreciation, in terms
of utility, of a good that is sold on the black market, compared to the same good
sold on the legal market).
I assume that the representative consumer has the standard utility function (U)
for imperfect substitute goods; with no restrictions on the (positive) quantities x
and y that can be consumed, as far as the consumer’s budget constraint is satisﬁed.
U(x,y,M) = (x − x
2) + θ(y − y
2) + 2σxy + M (1)
where σ ∈ [0,1] is the degree of substitutability between X and Y (the two goods
are perfect substitutes if σ = 1), and θ ∈ [0,1] is the aversion-towards-illegality
parameter.7 When θ = 1, the consumer has no prejudice against the illegal good.
The consumer has an exogenous income I, on which he pays an income tax,
which rate is t. An itemised deduction is a reduction in the tax base depending on
the number of units of good that are (legally) purchased. The deduction is per-unit
(opposed to per-value), this has the nice property of avoiding unnecessary inﬂation.
The deduction is of amount a for any purchased unit exceeding the threshold x0
7While σ depends on the real characteristicsof the goods, θ is the type of the consumer/society.
The larger θ, the more likely are people to accept to break the law.
3(and 0 otherwise). The (exogenous) threshold x0 is equal to the number of units
that are purchased when itemised deductions are not allowed. Introducing the
threshold allows to reduce the cost for the government of implementing this policy,
without aﬀecting its eﬀectiveness.




s.t. px + qy + M = I − t(I − a(x − x0))
From the ﬁrst order conditions, we derive the inverse demand function respec-
tively for X and Y :
p(x,y) = 1 − 2x − 2σy + ta (3)
and
q(x,y) = θ − 2θy − 2σx (4)
2.2 The market
The organisation of the industry heavily depends on the type of good that we
consider. The common factor is that we have two sub-markets, one for the legal
and one for the illegal good. The simplest market that we can imagine is a duopoly,
with one ﬁrm operating in each sub-market. This structure can apply, for example,
to the case of a regulated legal market, in presence of an illegal cartel. In that
case, one single agent is choosing the quantity and price on the legal market (the
regulator) and one on the black market (the cartel). It seems reasonable to consider
that the legal ﬁrm sets its own quantity and price, anticipating the behaviour of
the illegal ﬁrm. For that reason, the natural way to model this framework is the
Stackelberg competition with the legal ﬁrm acting as the leader.
For expositional convenience, I restrain my attention, in the core of the paper,
to the Stackelberg duopoly case, that seems to me the best compromise between
simplicity of the model and realism. The reader should not think that results
are driven by this assumption; results hold (qualitatively) for a much larger set
of market conﬁgurations. In the appendix I solve the problem for the case of
Cournot competition, with n ﬁrms operating on the legal market and m ﬁrms on
the underground market.
X and Y are produced by two independent ﬁrms competing ` a la Stackelberg
and facing the same marginal cost of production c. The legal ﬁrm is the leader
and chooses the quantity ﬁrst, and the illegal one follows. By deﬁnition, only the
legal ﬁrm pays the tax T on its proﬁts. The maximisation problem of the follower,
4given the demand function q(x,y), is
max
y
(q(x,y) − c)y (5)
s.t. q(x,y) = θ − 2θy − 2σx
from which we obtain the follower’s reaction function
y =
θ − 2σx − c
4θ
(6)
The Stackelberg leader maximisation problem is therefore:
max
x
(1 − T)(p(x,y) − c)x (7)
s.t. p(x,y) = 1 − 2x − 2σy + ta
y =
θ − 2σx − c
4θ
2.3 The government
The government is concerned by total tax proceeds (TP), which are given by the
sum of consumers’ income tax proceeds and ﬁrms’ proﬁts tax proceeds, and which
are equal to
TP(a) = T(p(x,y) − c)x + t(I − a(x − x0) (8)
The focus of this research is on itemised deductions; for that reason, I assume
that both tax rates are exogenous (that is, the government has already chosen
the optimal rates) and I focus on the optimal level of deduction. Therefore, the
government only controls the level of a, which represents the reduction in the tax
base for each unit of x purchased above the threshold x0 to which the representative
consumer is entitled.
The optimal level of deduction is deﬁned, according to this maximisation pro-
blem, as the one that maximises tax proceeds. Clearly, the objective function of
the social planner/politician may be diﬀerent, ranging from minimising the size of
the underground market to the reduction of the tax rate for some agents in the
economy. These questions are beyond the scope of this work.
3 Market equilibrium and optimal deduction
In this section, I compute the market equilibrium, ﬁnding the optimal quantities
and prices both for the legal and illegal ﬁrm. Afterwards, I compute the optimal
5level of deduction a.
Solving equation (7), from the ﬁrst order condition we obtain that
x
∗(a) =






Replacing x∗ in equation (6), we obtain that
y
∗(a) =






and ﬁnally, using (9) and (10) we can also compute prices:
p
∗(a) =














As we are interested in a market with tax evasion, when the itemised deduc-
tion is not allowed (i.e., a = 0) we want the quantity of good purchased on the
underground market to be positive (y∗(0) > 0), which occurs if and only if
c <
θ(4θ − σ2 − 2σ)
(4θ − σ2 − 2θσ)
(13)
Assuming also that
θ > σ (14)
is suﬃcient to guarantee that condition (13) is not requiring a negative marginal
cost.
Conditions (13) and (14) are suﬃcient to ensure that both prices and quantities
are positive in equilibrium and that both the consumer’s and the ﬁrms’ problems
are strictly concave. 8.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium quantities x∗(a) and y∗(a) are respectively deﬁned
by equations (9) and (10), and the corresponding prices are p∗(a) and q∗(a), as
deﬁned by equations (11) and (12).
Proposition 2 The legally purchased quantity and its price (x∗(a) and p∗(a)) are
both increasing in the level of deduction a; the reverse is true for the quantity
bought illegally and for its price (y∗(a) and q∗(a)), which are decreasing in a.
8By the strict concavity of the problem, the previously shown results (derived from the ﬁrst
order conditions) represent the unique maxima of the corresponding maximisation problems
6Using the previous results, we can solve the government problem, consisting in




T(p(a) − c)x + t(I − a(x − x0)) (15)
s.t. x = x
∗(a)
From the ﬁrst order condition of the problem, we obtain that the optimal level
of itemised deduction is:
a
∗ =
T(θ(2 − σ) − c(2θ − σ))
2θt(2 − T)
(16)
Under the previous assumptions (13) and (14), the problem is strictly concave and
a∗ is always positive.
Proposition 3 Equation (16) deﬁnes the optimal level of the per-unit itemised de-
duction a∗ when the government’s aim is to maximise tax proceeds for a given level
of tax rates. The value a∗ is always positive, meaning that it is always beneﬁcial
to allow for the deduction.
3.1 Comparative statics
For its policy implications, a policy maker may be also interested in knowing the
eﬀect of the diﬀerent parameters on the optimal value a∗. This subsection brieﬂy




(θ(2 − σ) − c(2θ − σ))

























From the previous derivatives, we observe that the optimal deduction increases
in the tax rate on proﬁts T: when it is larger, reducing the size of the underground
market is more proﬁtable, therefore the public authority accepts larger losses on
7the consumer side. The opposite reasoning applies for a larger tax rate t: the
larger the tax on income, the more costly is to implement a deduction policy.
Whenever the legal ﬁrm’s proﬁts decrease, it becomes less proﬁtable to intro-
duce deductions, therefore the optimal value for a decreases. Both θ and c reduce
the proﬁts of the legal ﬁrm. The marginal cost of production, c, has a direct ef-
fect on proﬁts; θ measures how likely citizens are to buy on the illegal market: a
change in θ modiﬁes the marginal rate of substitution between X and Y . When θ
increases, X is replaced by Y and the legal ﬁrm’s proﬁts decrease. Consequently,
both an increase in θ and in c induce a reduction in the optimal value of a.
Also an increase in σ implies a reduction in the value of a. The reason is that
a larger value of σ means that X and Y are better substitutes. Consumers replace
Y by X more easily, deductions are more eﬀective and a smaller a is enough to
obtain an increase in the consumption of the legal good.
3.2 Deductions and auditing
Readers certainly noticed that I do not explicitly considered the possibility of
deterring evasion through auditing and ﬁning, a diﬀused technique that has been
largely studied in the theoretical, empirical and experimental literature.
Fining and auditing is a costly but also eﬀective way of reducing evasion and it
can and should be used together with itemised deductions and not as a substitute.
I implicitly assumed that, given costs of auditing and limited liability, the govern-
ment was already choosing the pair auditing-ﬁne that maximises tax proceeds.
The ﬁne aﬀects the ﬁnal expected proﬁt of the illegal ﬁrm, but (unless it deter-
mines the exit of the ﬁrm from the market) it does not aﬀect the decision about
quantities and prices. In this subsection, I study the main interaction between
auditing and the optimal deduction.
Considering auditing (and ﬁning), the maximisation problem of the under-
ground ﬁrm (equation (5)) becomes
max
y
− αF + (1 − αT)(q(x,y) − c)y (22)
s.t. q(x,y) = θ − 2θy − 2σx
where α is the probability of being audited and F is the ﬁne that the ﬁrm should
pay when audited. The value of α is aﬀecting proﬁts but not the reaction function,
which remains the same as in equation (6).
Denote by ∆(α) the cost of auditing, assumed to be increasing and convex; the
8maximisation problem of the government becomes
max
a,α
T(p(a) − c)x + t(I − a(x − x0)) + α(F + T(q(a) − c)y) − ∆(α) (23)




when deductions are allowed; while, for the case of no itemised deductions (i.e.,
a = 0), it is
max
a,α T(p(0) − c)x + tI + α(F + T(q(0) − c)y) − ∆(α) (24)




Using equation (24), the derivative with respect to α deﬁnes the optimal level
of audit when deductions are not allowed α∗(0), which is








−1(F + T(q(0) − c)y0) (26)
From q(a) and y(a) being decreasing functions of a follows that α∗ is also de-
creasing in a. The optimal audit level is the one that equates the expected beneﬁts
(i.e., the increase in tax proceeds) and its cost; when introducing deductions, the
size of the underground market shrinks, making it less proﬁtable to audit. When
the expected beneﬁts are reduced, the optimal audit level decreases.
Analogously, starting from when audits are not performed (α = 0), the level
of deduction decreases if the government introduces audit. The optimal deduction
equalises the increase in tax proceeds on the ﬁrm side with the losses generated
by the deduction on the consumer side. An extra loss appears in the presence




Proposition 4 Both itemised deductions and audit are instruments to reduce tax
evasion. A crowding out eﬀect exists among the two, but it does not imply that the
two measures are incompatible. An increase in deductions reduces the proﬁtability
of audits, and vice versa. If the audit cost function is continuous and well behaved,
(absent ﬁx costs of audit) the optimal levels α∗ and a∗ are both positive.
94 Analysis of the results
I derived the equilibrium prices and quantities for a consumption good that is sold
both on the legal and the underground market, under the assumption that the
ﬁrm operating on the legal market and the one on the black market compete ` a la
Stackelberg, with the legal ﬁrm representing the leader.9 Consumers perceive the
two goods as substitutes, with σ as a parameter of how substitute the two goods
are; and may have an aversion to illegality, represented by θ, that implies that,
ceteris paribus, a consumer prefers to buy the good legally.
Imposing only a condition on c, θ and σ that ensures some tax evasion, I
derived the optimal value for a, which is a per-unit itemised deduction that allows
consumers to reduce their tax base for any purchased unit of the legal good above
an exogenous threshold.
The deduction is independent of prices, otherwise we would observe an unne-
cessary artiﬁcial increase in the price p (inﬂation). The itemised deduction is a
cost for the government (the tax proceeds collected from consumers decrease); but
the consumption of legal good increases, generating extra proceeds from the tax
T. This second eﬀect oﬀsets the previous one as long as a ≤ a∗.
The optimal value a∗ is positive for any combination of the parameters: for the
government it is always beneﬁcial (in terms of tax proceeds) to allow for itemised
deductions. Furthermore, a induces a proﬁts reduction for the underground ﬁrm.
It is likely that proﬁts from the underground economy are invested in illegal acti-
vities, therefore itemised deductions can also be used to ﬁght illegal activities in
the country. Depending on the social welfare function, therefore, the government
may prefer a larger than optimal level of deduction (representing a loss in terms
of tax proceeds but inducing a reduction in crime).
Tables 1 and 2 propose some numerical examples of the results of the model,
for the case of t = T = 0.3, and c = 0.2; in table 1 θ = 1 and σ = 0.9, while
θ = 0.7 and σ = 0.5 in table 2.10
a = 0 a = a∗ = 0.259 a = 2.059
p 0.42 0.459 0.729
q 0.434 0.404 -
x 0.185 0.217 0.444
y 0.117 0.102 0
TP 0.3I+0.012 0.3I+0.014 0.3I-0.09
Table 1: Numerical example 1.
9In the appendix, I show the results for the Cournot case, which are qualitatively analogous.
10Values are cut after the 3rd decimal.
10a = 0 a = a∗ = 0.365 a = 3.405
p 0.511 0.566 1.02
q 0.355 0.339 -
x 0.189 0.223 0.5
y 0.111 0.099 0
TP 0.3I+0.018 0.3I+0.021 0.3I-0.194
Table 2: Numerical example 2.
The ﬁrst column represents the market equilibrium when deductions are not
allowed; the middle one is for the optimal level of deductions. When a = a∗,
the size of the underground economy shrinks, but it does not disappear. The
right column corresponds o a level of deduction large enough for the underground
market to disappear. The bottom row (i.e., TP) represents tax proceeds. You can
notice that the largest TP is attained when a = a∗.
5 Conclusions
This study investigates the eﬀectiveness of itemised deductions as a device to
reduce tax evasion, when both sides of the market (sellers and consumers) pay
some taxes (possibly with diﬀerent rates).
Consumers use their income to buy a good on the legal or underground market
(or both), to consume the numeraire good and to pay a tax on their exogenous
income. The legal and underground ﬁrms compete on quantities; the legal ﬁrm
pays a tax on proﬁt. Treating the tax rates as exogenous, the government chooses
the level of itemised deductions that maximises tax proceeds.
I show that the optimal level of deductions is always positive, meaning that
it is always beneﬁcial to allow for deductions in a market characterised by tax
evasion. Part of the eﬀect of deductions is oﬀset by the use of ﬁnes and audit to
discourage evasion. The cost of auditing and limited liability nevertheless make
ﬁnes an imperfect instrument; itemised deductions should not be considered as a
substitute of auditing systems but rather as a complement. The cost of deductions
consists in the drop in tax proceeds from consumers, but I show that this is more
than compensated by a fall in tax evasion of ﬁrms and by the subsequent increase
in tax proceeds.
Although I do not study welfare implications in my model, it is clear that the
reduction in tax evasion does not represent an increase in eﬃciency but only a
diﬀerent redistribution of welfare (from the underground ﬁrm to the government,
that will use it either to provide more public goods or to reduce tax rates). Cer-
tainly we do not observe a Pareto improvement; depending on the social welfare
function, we can expect an increase in welfare deriving from a better arbitrage
11amongst marginal utilities of money for the ﬁrm and consumers.
Provided that proﬁts on the black market are likely to be used for ﬁnancing
illegal activities, if the social welfare function includes the crimes rate in the coun-
try, or the country’s reputation on the international ground, the optimal level of
deduction would be above the one that maximises tax proceeds. Using this mo-
del results, it would be interesting to study the consequences on the underground
economy of a long term policy of deductions above the optimal level.
Another possible extension of this model would be to consider the implications
in terms of optimal behaviour for a politician. In particular, depending on how
proﬁts from the underground ﬁrm are used and/or distributed among shareholders,
would it be in the interest of a politician aiming to be elected to propose such a
policy?
Finally, this model can be applied to a labour supply-demand model; in order
to determine the conditions under which a reduction in the taxes on the labour
force would push ﬁrms to legally hire their employees (forcing them to declare their
income). In particular, it would be interesting to consider a more complex general
equilibrium model, in which agents income is endogenous and an analogous scheme
is used to convince workers to declare their income.
12Appendix
A The Cournot case
I solve here the model for the case of Cournot competition, with n legal and m
illegal ﬁrms being active on the market. The optimal value a∗ is quantitatively
diﬀerent, but it remains positive; all the previous results hold under Cournot
competition.
Each legal ﬁrm produces a quantity xi, with i ∈ [1,n]; the total quantity is
then x =
Pn
1 xi. The ﬁrms on the underground market produce a quantity yj,
with j ∈ [1,m]. The maximisation problem of the a legal ﬁrm is
max
xi
(1 − T)(p(x,y) − c)xi (27)
s.t. p(x,y) = 1 − 2x − 2σy + ta
while ﬁrms on the underground market face the following maximisation problem:
max
yj
(q(x,y) − c)yj (28)
s.t. q(x,y) = θ − 2σx − 2θy
The two corresponding ﬁrst order conditions are respectively








Assuming that ﬁrms are symmetric, and that therefore xi = xh for any i,h ∈
[0,n], and that yj = yk for any j,k ∈ [0,m], we have that
P
h6=i xh = (n−1)xi and
P
k6=j yk = (m − 1)yj.





(m + 1)(1 − c)θ − mσ(θ − c)
2((m + 1)(n + 1)θ − mnσ2)
+
(m + 1)θ





(n + 1)(θ − c) − nσ(1 − c)
2((m + 1)(n + 1)θ − mnσ2)
−
nσ
2((m + 1)(n + 1)θ − mnσ2)
ta (32)
13and the Cournot prices
p
c(a) =
θ[1 + m(1 − σ)] + c[mn(θ − σ2) + nθ + mσ]
(m + 1)(n + 1)θ − mnσ2 +
(m + 1)θ




θ[n(θ − σ) + θ] + c[mn(θ − σ2) + θ(m + n)σ]
(m + 1)(n + 1)θ − mnσ2 −
nθσ
(m + 1)(n + 1)θ − mnσ2ta
(34)
For the Cournot case with many ﬁrms, the assumptions that guarantee the
presence of tax evasion when deductions are not available become
c <
n(θ − σ) + θ







The assumption that θ ≥ σ is still suﬃcient for all the maximisation problems
to be concave and the results (quantities and prices) to be always positive.
Remembering that the aggregate legal quantity xc(a) is deﬁned as xc(a) =
nxc




































Solving the problem, we obtain the optimal level of deduction ac, which is now












It is easy to check that ac is always positive: (pc
0−c) > 0 is a necessary condition
to have a market in the case of no deduction, and (1 − pc
1T) is always positive.
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